digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

1987

Economic Rights of the Institutionalized Mentally
Disabled
Michael L. Perlin
New York Law School, michael.perlin@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons
Recommended Citation
Perlin, Michael L., "Economic Rights of the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled" (1987). Articles & Chapters. 1155.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1155

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

lnternationa/Journa/ofLawandPsych/atry, Vol.10, 187-214, 1987
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved.

0160-2527/87 $3.00 + .00
Copyright © 1987 Pergamon Journals Ltd.

Economic Rights of the Institutionalized
Mentally Disabled
·
Michael L. Perlin*

I. Introduction
The "explosion" 1 of litigation and legislation in all aspects of mental disability
law over the past 15 years has been well documented in the caselaw, 2 in state and
fed eral statutes,3 and in the law review literature.4 At least nine separate reasons- some of which appear internally paradoxical - seem to have made some
significant contribution to this explosion:
1. The activist posture of the Warren Court in the 1960's, leading a wide
array of minority groups to come to the federal courts in an attempt to seek
vindication of their civil rights.
2. The expansion of this "civil rights revolution" to include mentally disabled
persons at a time when revelations of substandard and often-dangerous living
conditions in state hospitals and state schools for the mentally retarded first
truly sensitized the public to the plight of the institutionalized mentally handicapped.
3. The Supreme Court's continuing fascination with all aspects of the law
affecting the mentally disabled.
•Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School, 57 Worth St., New York, NY 10013, U.S.A.
The a uthor wishes to thank Mark Dennison for his helpful research assistance.
'See La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFF. L. REV. 499
(1981) .
2See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (procedural due process in commitment decision-making) (subsequent citations omitted); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5 Cir. 1974) (right to treatment); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F. 2d 266 (3 Cir.
1983) (right to refuse treatment); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (right to refuse treatment); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (right to training).
3See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§6001 et seq. (1986 Supp .) (Developmentally Disabled Bill of Rights Act); 29 U.S.C.
§794 (1985) (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 42 U.S.C. §§10801 et seq. (1986 Supp.) (Pamph,
III); N.J.S.A. 30:4- 24. l to 24.2 (1981) (state patients' bill of rights).
4
See e.g. , LaFond, supra note I (involuntary civil commitment); Cook, The Substantive Due Process
Rights of Mentally Disabled Clients, 7 MENT. DIS. L. RPTR. 346 (1983) (right to treatment); Brooks, The
Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 179 (1980)
(right to refuse treatment); Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595
(1983) (right to deinstitutionalization); see generally Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, & Rogers, The Burger Court
and Mental Health Law 4 J. LEG. MED. 323 (1985).
See also, e.g., Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The
Last Frontier? 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1249 (1987) (in press) [hereinafter cited as Last Frontier]; Perlin, The

Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions,
Hidden Rationales, or 'Doctrinal Abyss'? 29 Ariz. L. Rev. I (1987).
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4. The proliferation of state and federal statutes focusing on treatment of the
institutionalized mentally disabled and discrimination against the handicapped
in community settings.
5. Changes in clinical treatment approaches and in social policy, leading
simultaneously to the recognition that mental handicap cannot be seen as a
monolithic all-or-nothing condition, and to the deinstitutionalization of thousands of formerly institutionalized individuals.
6. The development of an organized, coherent mental disability bar, resulting in proliferating caselaw, and an inevitable spillover to the rest of the bar.
7. Developments in tort law, expanding the notion of a therapist's "dut!' to
protect" third parties from certain mentally disabled individuals' poten~ially
dangerous actions, coming ironically, at a time when new research techniques
have called seriously into question the ability of psychiatrists to accurately
predict dangerousness.
8. Public outrage at the Hinckley acquittal, leading to a reexamination of the
role of responsibility as an exculpatory defense in criminal law, at a time wh_en
new social factors have been considered as possibly expanding the substantive
bases of such defenses, and
9. The emergence of state constitutions and statutes as independent sources
of such rights for handicapped individuals as the legal pendulum has begun to
shift away from expansive federal court readings of individual rights .
As a result of these reasons - which have led both to the expansion of rights
of the mentally disabled 5 and, paradoxically, to the contraction of other rights
(as a reflection of disenchantment on the part of the public at large and on
the part of the federal courts with the notion of vastly expanding the civil rights
and civil liberties of the mentally disabled) 6 -there has been a remarkable proliferation of cases involving almost all aspects of mental disability litigation,
especially on behalf of the institutionalized and the formerly-institutionalized.
7
These cases have involved the articulation of procedural due process rights,
substantive due process rights, 8 the right to treatment or training,9 the right to
5The first six of the listed reasons combined to lead to the development of the caselaw cited supra note 2 and
the statutes cited supra note 3. See generally Last Frontier, supra note 4.
6The last three of the enumerated reasons have led to such developments as the passage of the restrictive
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, see 18 U.S.C. §20 (1986 Supp .), expanded duties of psychotherapists to
protect potential victims from violent patients, see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of University of
California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P. 2d 334 (Sup. Ct. 1976), and Supreme Court decisions
such as Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 104 s. Ct. 900 (1984) (expanding the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment so as to drastically curtail federal suits against state officials in a wide variety of factsettings in cases seeking relief under either pendent state jurisdiction or federal statutes). But see, The
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, P.L. 99-506, §10032 (a)(!), legislatively limiting the applicability of
the Eleventh Amendment in cases involving federal statues prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped .
Pertinent scholarship discussing Pennhurst is collected in Note, The Eleventh Amendment's Lengthy
Shadow Over Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction : Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 34
DEPAUL L. REV. 515 n .l (1985).
7See, e.g., Lessard, supra.
8See O'Connor, supra .
9 See, e.g., Wyatt, supra; Youngberg, supra .
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refuse treatment, 10 and the right to deinstitutionalization. 11 What is surprising,
however, is the relative paucity of litigation 12 focusing on the important questions of the scope of economic rights of the institutionalized mentally disabled. 13
This lack of attention is significant for several reasons. First, there is ample
therapeutic evidence that economic self-sufficiency is a critical determinant as
to whether an inpatient will ultimately be reintegrated into the community. 14
Second, as the link between homelessness and deinstitutionalization policies
continues to be explored, 15 it becomes clearer that post-institutional poverty is
perhaps the most important factor in determining whether a deinstitutionalized
patient will be added to the growing roster of the nation's homeless. 16 Third,
while there have been extensive commentaries- by lawyers and mental health
professionals alike - on virtually every facet of such mental disability issues as
procedural due process rights, 17 treatment rights, 18 and the scope of the right to
10
See Rennie, supra; Rogers, supra.
"See Pennhurst, supra.
12 C/. Perlin & Siggers, The Role of the Lawyer in Mental Health Advocacy, 4 BULL. AM . ACAD.
PSYCH. & L. 204, 209 (1976) (advocacy office's law reform caseload showed "clear pattern in . . . progression from procedural cases to substantive cases to economic cases"). See also Perlin, Ten Years After:
Evolving Mental Health Advocacy and Judicial Trends, 15 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 335, 338 (1986-87)

(over past decade, "the first legal awakening of interest in the whole notion of economic rights" has developed).
13 Contrarily, the Supreme Court has paid some important attention to economic issues of great significance
to mental health providers. See, e.g., Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 459 U.S. 465 (1982) (consumer
antitrust suit could be maintained where she alleged Blue Shield and state psychiatric association conspired to
refuse reimbursement for certain visits to clinical psychologist); see generally Perlin, Recent Developments in
Mental Health Law, in 6 Sadoff ed., PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 539, 547-548
(1983).
14 This issue has been explored most extensively in the context of litigation centering around the question of
a patient's right to be paid for institutional labor following the decision in Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp.
808 (D.D.C. 1973) (minimum wage provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) apply to most
institutional labor at public mental institutions). See, e.g., Perlin, The Right to Voluntary, Compensated,
Therapeutic Work: A New Theory in the Aftermath of Souder, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 298 (1976) ("Right
to Work"); Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567
(1974); see also, e.g., King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41, 44 (W.D.N. Y. 1975).
While the continuing vitality of Souder was sharply questioned following the Supreme Court's decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (aspects of the FLSA extending minimum wage
protections to state employees held unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment), National League has since
been overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985), raising the
question as to whether the Souder methodology might yet be resuscitated. For a recent revisionist view of the
appropriateness of applying FLSA provisions to patient labor, see Blaine & Mason, Application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act to Patient Work Programs at Mental Health Institutions: A Proposal for Change, 27
B.C. L. REV. 553 (1986).
"See, e.g., Mills & Cummins, Deinstitutionalization Revisited, 5 INT'L J. L . & PSYCHIATRY 271 (1982);
Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY
L.J. 375 (1982).
16See, e.g., Lipton & Sabitini, Constructing Social Support Systems for Chronic Patients, in Lamb, ed.,
THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 153, 156 (1984); Williams et al., Deinstitutiona/ization and Social
Po/icy: Historical Perspectives and Present Dilemmas, 50 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCH. 54 61-64 (1980). Cf.
Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
232, 288 (1976): "Many patients remain in confinement because they are too poor to be released."
17 See, e.g., LaFond, supra note I.
18 See, e.g., Cook, supra note 4; Brant, supra note 4.
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refuse treatment, 19 the journals have been virtually silent on the entire topic of
economic rights of the institutionalized mentally disabled.
This Article will consider some of the underdiscussed economic issues of
significance to the institutionalized mentally disabled and their families: (1) the
right of the mentally disabled to control their own assets while institutionalized;20 (2) the right of the committing authority to bill such individuals (and/ or
their families) for "care and maintenance" during institutionalization; 21 (3) the
limitations on the appointment of representative payees to manage the finances
of certain patients, 22 and (4) the interplay between state billing statutes and
other federal laws suggesting that certain governmental benefits may not be
"attached" by state authorities. 23
Examination of these cases should reveal the extent to which economic rights
issues have been considered carefully by the courts, the doctrinal principles (if
any) that have been developed, the interplay (if any) between these cases and
the other patients rights developments previously discussed, and the future
paths which litigation and scholarship in this area can reasonably by expected
to take.
II. The Right of the Institutionalized to Control Their Own Assets

Although the issue has not been litigated extensively, 24 it appears to be relatively well settled that institutionalized mentally disabled persons cannot be
deprived of the right to control their own assets absent a finding of incompetency consistent with rudimentary due process safeguards. 25
t9See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 4; Brant, supra note 4.
20see Part II, infra.
21 See Part III, infra.
22see Part IV, infra.
2JSee Part V, infra.
2•cJ Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S . 715, 737 (1972) ("Considering the number of persons affected, it is
perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on [the civil commitment] power have not
been more frequently litigated") (footnotes omitted).
In the otherwise-exhaustive and seminal 2300-page, three volume set of reference books published in I 979
by the Practising Law Institute and the Mental Health Law Project (MHLP), there is thus virtually no
mention of economic rights of patients. See 1-3 Friedman, ed., LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS (P.L. I. 1979). And, in the just-published, similarly-exhaustive two volume set of reference books-published by the MHLP for the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systemsthere is but one brief three-page note as to issues involving cost of care of institutionalization. See 2 MHLP,
eds., PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE LABELLED MENTALLY ILL 597
(1987).
2ssee, e.g., Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), further proceedings 426 F. Supp
1297 (E .D. Pa. 1977), afj'd 558 F. 2d 150 (3 Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S . 943 (1977); McAuliffe v. Carlson,
377 F. Supp. 896 (D. Conn. 1974), suppl. 386 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1975), rev'd on other gds. 520 F. 2d
1305 (2 Cir. 1975), cert. den. 427 U.S . 911 (1976). See also, Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Connell, No.
83870 (N.J., Hudson City. Ct., Dec. 2, 1975) (county court vacated order which would have attached, for care
and maintenance, all income of county hospital patients in excess of $25 per month, and ordered individual
hearings on the appropriateness of such assessments), discussed in "Right to Work," supra note 14, at 338
n.183.
On the other hand, many states with "Patients' Bills of Rights" include statutory provisions granting
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.In the lead case of Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 26 the district court was faced
With the question of a Pennsylvania statutory scheme21 which enabled the state
to summarily 28 seize and control assets and property of certain 29 mental patients
and the? apply portions of those assets to cover the costs of the patients' car;
and mamtenance while institutionalized. 30
Afte: finding that the division in the statutory scheme31 violated the equal
Protect10n clause (in that it was "irrational, arbitrary and ... wholly unrelated
to any purpose of the law in which the classification is made"), 32 the court
turned to plaintiff's procedural due process arguments. Preliminarily, it noted
that t~e d~fe~dants (state officials) conceded that "'men!al patients are, barring
a~ ad3ud1cat10n of incompetency, capable of managmg their financial affa~r~,"'33 and that apparently-uncontested expert testimony concluded that "dePnvmg mental patients of any control and responsibility over their own funds

in st itutionalized mentally disabled persons the right to control and to manage their own personal property
and money. See, e.g., Mich Stat. Ann. §14.800 (730) (3), (4) (1980) (except where denial is "essential in order
to prevent the [patient] from unreasonably and significantly dissipating his assets," a patient "is entitled to
easy access to the money in his account and to spend or otherwise use the money as he chooses"). See Beis,
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 183-184 (1984). For an overview of all statutes, see Lyon, Levine &
Zusman, Patients' Bills of Rights: A Survey of State Statutes, 6 MENT. DIS. L. RPTR. 185 (1982), and LyonLevine, Levine & Zusman, Developments in Patients' Bill of Rights Since the Mental Health Systems Act, 9
MENT. & PHYS. DIS . L. RPTR. 146 (1985).
26
377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974), further proceedings 426 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd 558 F. 2d
l50 (3 Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 943 (1977).
27
50 Pa. Stat . §§4424, 4501 (1966).
28
See, e.g., 50 Pa. Stat. §4424 (I) (1966) ("The authorized agent . . . shall, without application lo any
court, take custody of, receive and manage ... any money or other personal property in [certain patients']
Possession ... ") (emphasis added). See infra note 29, for a discussion of which patients were covered by this
Provision .
29
Under the statutory scheme, two classes of patients were "created" for the purposes of due process
safeguards: patients who had not been adjudicated incompetent (who were denied prior notice and hearing
Pri~r to seizure of their assets), and patients who had been adjudicated incompetent who were afforded such
notice and hearing. Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1363.
. These classes were further separated on the basis of the amount of assets belonging to individual patients;
if an incompetent patient had more than $2500 in assets, a guardian would be appointed; if he had less than
that amount, however, the failure to provide for notice and hearing meant that such patients "generally ha[d]
no guardian or court to protect their assets." Id.
30
See generally Part III, infra .
3
'See supra note 29.
32
Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1369. The court noted that the state could point to "no rational basis, not even
revenue raising," id. at 1368, to justify the classification, which it characteriz~d as "coun~er-~,rod~ctive and
Intemally inconsistent with the goals of the (Mental Health Procedures] Act . and as_ berng arbitrary_ and
capricious." Id. Cf, e.g., Mernitz, Private Responsibility for the Costs of Care m Public Mental lnsfttuftons,
36 IND.L:J. 443, 444 (1961) ("[U]p-to-date procedures for the determination ~nd _en~orce~ent of private
responsibility can greatly enhance attempts to secure substantial revenues from rnst1tut1onahzed persons or
their families.")
In light of its finding that the state law did not meet the minimum rationality test of_ the equal protection
clause, the Vecchione court found it unnecessary to consider. whether "fundamental nghts and/ or suspect
cl~ssifications require a strict scrutiny test in this case. Id. at 1369 n.11. Cf City o(Cleb_urne, Tex. v. Cleburne
~ 1Ving Center, 105 s. Ct. 3249 (1985) (applying rational basis test to case rnvolvrng mentally retarded
individuals).
33
Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1367 (quoting from Partial Transcript, at 58).
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would tend to prolong a person's stay in a mental hospital, while giving them
such control and responsibility is therapeutic." 34
With this backdrop, the court found the statutory sections in question unconstitutional in that they failed to provide appropriate procedural due process
safeguards. 35 The income and governmental benefits 36 "intercepted and appropriated" by defendants were matters of "statutory entitlement to plaintiff," and
thus to be treated as property entitled to constitutional protection under the due
process clause.37
This analysis was further buttressed by analogy to a Second Circuit case
which had found that a state's failure to provide adequate notice prior to the
appointment of a committee to disburse a patient's assets was unconstituti~nal;38 where a state "does not even provide a judicial hearing, let alone notice
thereof [, a] fortiori the practice . .. must be set aside as violative of the Due
Process Clause."39
The court specifically rejected defendants' argument in support of the practice in question: that there is often an immediate threat of "destruction, loss or
mismanagement ... by this type of plaintiff."40 First, even if this practice was
"generally justifiable under the facts," the statutes in question were overly
broad, 41 and, in some cases, irrebuttable. 42
Second, and, in the court's view, more fundamentally, the factual underpinning of this argument-that mental patients are "presumptively incapable of
43
handling their own funds [ - ] has been stripped by the record in this case." As
the court had rejected defendants' hypothesis that mental patients may be
presumed less competent to handle their own assets than the public at large,
"there is no legitimate justification for the [defendants'] interference with plaintiff's custody and control of her property without an adjudication that she was
incompetent to manage it. 44
i•Jd. at J.367, and see cited sources.
See also, e.g., Koe v. Califano, 573 F. 2d 761, 763 n .5 (2 Cir. 1978):

SSI payments make possible the purchase of items essential to any human existence transcending bare subsistence. The loss of such payments imposes a readily understandable burden; less
obvious but perhaps no less significant are the uncertainty and feelings of rejection inflicted by
the continuous threat of deprivation on those who have so little and are mentally ill.
377 F. Supp. at 1370, citing, inter alia, Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S . 67, 82 (1972).
J6Defendants had summarily seized social security benefits of plaintiff's "without notice and hearing or
explanation." Id . at 1365. Plaintiff argued that, absent a knowing voluntary and intelligent assignment of
such benefits, they were "insulated from claims of creditors, including the state" under both federal statute
(42 U.S.C. §407 (1970)) and case law (Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd. , 409 U.S . 413 (1973)). /d. at 1366.
See Woodall v. Bartolino, Civil No . 85-1781(MTB) (D.N .J., Oct. 24, 1985), discussed in Part V, infra, for a
general discussion of the question of the application of §407 and Philpott to institutionalized mental patients.
i,Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1370, citing, inter alia, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
JBDale v. Hahn, 486 F. 2d 76 (2 Cir. 1973).
J9Vecchione, 377 F. Supp. at 1371.
4-0/d.
•1Jd.
•2Jd. n.14.
•i/d. at 1372.
44for a general discussion of post-Vecchione procedures, see Tartaglia v. Com ., Dept. of Public Welfare,
416 A. 2d 608, 612 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1980). Vecchione was followed in a parallel case involving Veterans'
i s Vecchione,
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In a different factual context, 45 another federal district court similarly struck
~own as unconstitutional a Connecticut statute which authorized the state
fmance ~ommissioner to serve as conservator of funds of any mentally ill
person with property or annual income of less than $5000 committed or admitted to a state mental institution.46 As such hospital admission "does not support
even a presumption that a mental patient is incompetent,"47 the state's irrebuttable presumption of incompetency violated due process. 48
. Because the statute exempted persons with more than $5000 in assets, it also
violated the equal protection clause as it was "irrational to think that all or even
most state mental patients without real property and income of more than
$5000.00 are incompetent."49
III. Right to Bill for "Care and Maintenance"

(A) Authority to Bill Patients
The majority of involuntary civil commitment statutes require that the institutionalized mentally disabled person (or a legally responsible relative) pay for
son:ie percentage50 of the person's cost of institutionalization.51 These statutes 52
vanously stipulate payment for, inter alia, "care, transportation and treatAdministration benefits in In re Grcich, 492 Pa . 210, 423 A. 2d 347, 350 n.7 (Sup. Ct. 1980), cert. den. 450
U.S. 997 (1981).
The practical impact of Vecchione has been questioned in Burgdorf, ed., THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF
HANDICAPPED PERSONS 562 (Paul R. Brookes 1980) (all of the first 179 due process hearings held in
conformity with Vecchione decree led to declarations that patients were incompetent to handle their own
Property). For the appellate decision in one such case, see Matter of Caine, 490 Pa . 24, 415 A. 2d 13, 14 n.2
(Sup. Ct. 1980).
45
McAuliffe, supra, was brought by a patient who was transferred to a mental health facility from a city
correctional center, where he had been serving a term of imprisonment following a felony conviction . 377 F.
Supp.at 898.
·
46
Id. at 904. Plaintiff had argued that this statute deprived him of his "civil rights to enter and enforce
contracts, settle and enforce obligations or make gifts of his property without the essential safeguards of
notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue of his competency." Id.
47
Id., citing Winters v. Miller, 446 F. 2d 65, 68 (2 Cir. 1971), applied specifically in Connecticut in Logan v.
Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1269-1270 (D. Conn. 1972).
8
' Id. at 905 .
49
Id. Subsequently, the Second Circuit reversed on Eleventh Amendment grounds a supplemental order
Which had directed defendants to return certain property to plaintiff. See 520 F. 2d 1305 (2 Cir. 1975), rev'g
386 F. Supp. 1245 (D. Conn. 1975).
sosee Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 946
0 95 9); Mernitz, supra note 32, at 466, and id. n.82 (only IOOJo of actual costs recovered).
51
Developments in the Law- Civil Commitment, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1365 (1974) ("Developments"),
and see, for a sampling of statutes, id. n.221 . See, for a detailed description of two contrasting acts (Virginia's
a_nd West Virginia's), Note, West Virginia's Reimbursement Statute: The f!idden C~sts of In_stitutionalization, 85 W. VA. L. REV. 12l, l29-l33 (1982), and see, for a thorough histoncal overview, Mermtz, supra note
32.
52
For an analysis of why these statutes generally may increase in importance in the near future (because of
expected diminution of alternative federal funding sources and a "change in public attitude toward the
economically disadvantaged"), see Note, 85 w. VA. L. REV., supra note 51, at 134.

194

MICHAEL L. PERLIN

ment," 53 "care and treatment," 54 "service and treatment,"55 and "examination,
maintenance, and treatment." 56
In addition, the payment responsibility statutes are often unclear as to the
employment of a mechanism by which a patient's precise liability can be assessed;57 various statutes and regulations mitigate assessments based upon "clinical reasons," 58 "substantial hardship," 59 "ability to provide for payment,"60 being
"reasonably able to pay,"61 or having "sufficient financial ability." 62 Statutes
variously incorporate specific pay schedules 63 and mandate that state mental
health departments adopt regulations to set up such standards. 64
While such statutes have been challenged on a variety of grounds, they have
been regularly upheld against substantive attack; 65 however, in some instances,
courts have struck down provisions for violations of procedural due process
rights. 66
Thus, courts have uniformly rejected statutory challenges which have raised
the argument that the distinction between mental patients (who must pay) and
prisoners (who are not so billed) violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 67 or that they impermissibly delegate legislative authority to state executive agencies. 68
One the other hand, courts have examined carefully the way such statutes are
invoked, and have both struck down provisions which failed to provide for

sJA laska Stat. §47.30.9 10 (a) (1985).
s•vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 18, §8 101 (1985 Supp.). Under the Vermont law, the patient (or a legally responsible
relativ~) must pay or contribute to the payment "in such manner and proportion as the commissioner [of
Mental Health] shall determine to be within [his] ability to pay").
sswyo. Stat. Ann. §25-10-202 (a) (1985).
l6Ariz. Rev. Stat. §36-545 .01 (1974).
l7"Developments," supra note 51, at 1366.
ss55 Pa. Code §4305.7 (b) (3) (1985). Abatement will be granted under this section only where (I) the
imposition of the maximum liability would be likely to "negate the effectiveness of treatment, or prohibit the
client's entry into treatment," and (2) the failure to provide such treatment "would result in serious harm to
the client's welfare or in greater cost to this Commonwealth due to deterioration of the client's condition." See
generally, Faix v. Com. Dept. of Public Welfare, 499 A. 2d 411 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1985).
s9See 55 Pa. Code §4305.7 (2) (1985), discussed in Faix, supra.
60See, e.g., A laska Stat. §47 .30.910 (a) (1985).
6'See, e.g. D.C. Code Ann. §21-586 (b) (1981).
62See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §64-7-6 (1978).
6JSee, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. §246. 511 (1982).
64See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. §25- 10-202 (a) (1985).
For a philosophical inquiry into the relationship between the reimbursement mechanisms and prevailing
public attitudes toward the mentally ill, see Mernitz, supra note 32, at 481-482.
65See, e.g., infra notes 67-68.
66See, e.g., infra notes 69-71. But see, Hospital Services, Inc. v. Farnsworth, 393 N.W. 2d 446 (N.Dak.
Sup. Ct. 1986) (statute of limitations inapplicable in suit against former patient); see generally on statute of
limitation questions in cases involving patients' estates, Part Ill(C), infra.
61Faye v. Stapley, 607 F. 2d 858, 863 (9 Cir. 1979), collecting cases. Cf Department of Mental Hygiene v.
Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P. 2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1964), vacated 380 U.S . 194 (1965), on
remand 62 Cal. 2d 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P. 2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (challenge to imposition of liability
on certain relatives of institutionalized patients upheld on state constitutional grounds).
68See, e.g., State ex rel. Macey v. Johnson, 296 P. 2d 588, 589-590 (Idaho Sup. Ct. 1931) (collecting earlier
cases).
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adequate personal notice 69 or for a hearing10 for institutionalized persons who
had never been declared legally incompetent, and have ordered trials to determine whether a patient actually received notice of a petition seeking to require
maintenance payments. 11
Courts have also considered whether such maintenance charges against patients may be sustained on an unjust enrichment theory. In a case where patients were committed illegally, 72 the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that
specific argument:
Because the [commitment] proceedings were not adequate to sustain
a finding that the individuals were in need of care and treatment,
regardless of the fact that they may have been in need of such care
and treatment, there was no valid commitment order. Thus, the
plaintiffs cannot be considered "committed" for any purpose, and
they do not fall under the literal reading of [th~care and maintenance
statute]. 73
Finally, a court has rejected the argument of a patient's guardian seeking to
raise the question of the reasonableness of the charges assessed against his ward
while a state hospital resident, in a state where he alleged that "reasonable
value" 74 was the statutory test for reimbursement. 75 Although the guardian
wished to introduce evidence to show that profit-making private institutions
were charging from 20 to 33% of the state's charges for providing "the same
care and treatment that the public institution furnished," 76 this would not be a
proper topic for inquiry at a maintenance hearing:
69
Foundation for the Handicapped v. Dep't of Social and Health Services, 97 Wash 2d 691, 648 P. 2d 884,
887-888 (Sup. Ct. 1982); Duffy v. Dep't of Social and Health Services, 90 Wash 2d 673, 585 P. 2d 470 (Sup.
Ct. 1978).
70
McConaghley v. City of New York, 60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S. 2d 136, 137-138 (Civil Ct. 1969).
71
Fayle, 607 F. 2d at 862.
72
See Stale ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W. 2d 573 (Sup . Ct. 1977), invalidating a ll
Milwaukee County commitments during the relevant time period for violations of the patients' right to
counsel and right to jury trial.
13
lankowski v. Milwaukee County, 104 Wis. 2d 431,312 N.W. 2d 45, 48 (Sup. Ct. 1981). On the question
of the "benefits" that plaintiffs may have received, the court made this observation:

Plaintiff makes this cogent argument in his petition for review before this court: "OF what
value is a bed on a locked ward to a person illegally deprived of access to his/ her own home? To
a person who is not mentally ill, of what possible benefit is treatment such as psychotropic
medication? And of what use is occupational therapy to one whose illegal commitment has
prevented him/ her from going to work? To presume that the services were of value to plaintiffs
ignores the grossly defective procedures by which they were committed and the importance of
the due process protections for fair and correct judicial determinations.

Id. n.5.
14
Cal. Civil. Co. §38 (1982). The statute in question, first enacted in 1872, reads:
A person entirely without understanding has no power to make a contract of any kind, but he is
liable for the reasonable value of things furnished to him necessary for his support or the
support of his family.
(Emphasis added).
15
/n re Estate of Gridley, 32 Cal. App . 3d 268, 108 Cal. Rptr. 200 (Ct. App. 1973).
16
Gridley, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
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[Ilf each person liable under the law as constitutionally applied were
permitted to question the price of pills, nursing and psychiatric se~vices, room and board, by adducing the testimony of an expert of his
choice in separate actions for the recovery of charges, the situation
would be chaotic. [Analogizing to the test77 employed in cases involving special assessment proceedings, "thel final decision ... is conclusive unless attacked on the ground of fraud or mistake .. • • "
If there is graft, fraud or gross inefficiency which is pushing u~ ~he
actual costs of the services in question the matter is one to be rectified
by governmental action prodded by a vigilant public . . . [TJhe
charges determined in accordance with the statutory mandate should
control, in the absence of evidence showing that the determination
itself was erroneous because of some dereliction of duty by the officer computing them, or because he acted in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. . . .78
(B) Authority to Bill Relatives
Most modern cases79 have held that statutes imposing liability upon ~he estates of relatives of institutionalized mentally disabled persons for their care
8
and maintenance are a legitimate exercise of legislative power. ° Courts ~ave
been willing, however, to consider "competition" between (or among) re_latives
and the impact of post-hospitalization divorce on liability in such circumstances. 81
(1) Upholding Authority

Cases which uphold statutes imposing liability on relatives date to the Elizabethan Poor Laws of Great Britain82 and are generally based on the theory that
such a law "merely recognizes the imperfect moral obligation [to support an
institutionalized relative] and makes of it a legal one."83 The historical basis for
such holdings is reflected in the words of a nineteenth century decision:
It can hardly be said that there is no moral duty whatever imposed
upon a man, who has sufficient financial ability consistently with his
duty to himself and to others, to supply the necessaries of life to a
brother or sister who is unable to earn a livelihood in consequence of
See Larsen v. San Francisco, 182 Cal. 1, 14, 186 P. 757, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1920).
BGridley, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 208-209.
79 For an overview of earlier cases, see Annotation, Constitutionality of Statute Imposing Liability Upon
Estate or Relatives of Insane Person for His Support in Asylum, 20 A.L .R. 3d 363.
80 See generally, Part llI (B)(l), infra. This view is not unanimous, however. See, e.g., Department of Mental
Hygiene v. Kirschner, 60 Cal. 2d 716,388 P. 2d 720, 26 Cal. Rptr. 488 (Sup. Ct. 1964), vacated, 380 U.S. 194
(1965), on remand 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P. 2d 381, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1965), discussed at Part III
(B)(2), infra .
81 See Part lll (B)(3), infra .
82 See 43 Eliz. c.2 §7 (1601), cited in Beach v. Gov't of the District of Columbia, 520 F. 2d 790, 792 n.4
(D.C.Cir. 1963). Most contemporaneous American statutes are "little more than a paraphrase of . • • the
Elizabethan poor law." Mernitz, supra note 32, at 452.
83 State v. Bateman, 110 Kan . 546, 204 P. 682 683 (Sup . Ct. 1922).
11
1
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bodily infirmity, idiocy, lunacy, or other unavoidable cause ... The
object of both the statute of Elizabeth and of our existing statute is to
protect the public from loss occasioned by neglect of a moral or
natural duty imposed on individuals, and to do this by transforming
the imperfect moral duty into a statutory and legal liability. 84
With this backdrop, most courts disposed quickly of constitutional challenges by patients' relatives. First, arguments based on state constitutional
provisions requiring state support of such institutions were rejected on the
theory that such sections did not mandate the provision of services to patients
at the sole expense of the state. 85 Second, equal protection claims premised on
both the state and federal constitutions 86 arguing that patients' relatives were
being doubly taxed have been denied as "specious" because of the "special
relationship" between the patient and his relative. 81 Third, challenges based on
the theory that liability laws constituted special or class legislation (since they
differentiated between patients confined in state hospitals and those housed
elsewhere) have similarly been turned back on the theory that "the distinction
between the helpless and those able to help themselves is a natural one [that]
pervades the laws of all civilized countries."88 Also, arguments premised on an
improper delegation theory 89 have been rejected where courts have found that
the statutory provisions in question contained reasonable standards to properly
guide the administrator charged with their effectuation. 90
Also, in upholding another liability statute in face of a due process challenge,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals limited the relative's liability only as
to that date on which hospital authorities first demanded contributions from
him (as opposed to the time, soon after her commitment, when the patient's
own assets were depleted).9' On the other hand, an Indiana intermediate appeals
court ruled that a change in the "responsible relatives" statute did not abrogate
a father's responsibility for his son's care and maintenance prior to the effective
date of the amendment. 92
84
People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1896), as quoted in Beach, 320 F. 2d at 792-793
(footnote omitted). See also, e.g., In re Idleman's Commitment, 146 Or. 13, 27 P. 2d 305 (Sup . Ct. 1933);
Commonwealth v. Zommick, 362 Pa. 299, 66 A. 2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
85
State Rev. Div. of Dept. of Treas. v. Estate of Raseman, 18 Mich. App. 91, 170 N.W. 2d 503, 506 (Ct.
App . 1969) (Raseman); see also, e.g., State v. Kiesewetter, 37 Ohio St. 546 (Sup. Ct. 1882); Kaiser v. State, 80
Kan. 364, 102 P. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1909), construing similar provisions; see also Department of Public Welfare v.
Haas, 15 Ill . 2d 204, 154 N.E. 2d 265, 270-271 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (rejecting challenge based on state's constitutional provision mandating a "thorough and efficient" education); see generally, Levine v. Institutions and
Agencies Dept. of N.J., 84 N.J. 234, 418 A. 2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1980), criticized as "unfortunate[)" in Note, 85
W.VA. L . REV., supra note 51, at 126. See also Levine, 84 N.J. at 268, 269 (Pashman, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for having "completely abdicated its fundamental responsibility of constitutional
judicial review," a nd for a result which "diminishes the meaning of our common humanity").
86
See, e.g., Department of Mental Health v. Coty, 38 Ill. 2d 602, 232 N .E. 2d 686 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
87
Raseman, 170 N.W. 2d at 506-507.
88In re Yturburru's Estate, 134 Cal. 567, 66 P. 729 (Sup. Ct. 1901). See also State v. Troxler, 202 Ind. 268,
173 N.E . 321 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Wigington v. State Home & Training School, 486 P. 2d 417,420 (Colo. Sup. Ct.
1971).
89 See Part IIl(D), infra.
90Kough v. Roehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E. 2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
91
Beach, 320 F. 2d at 794 .
92
Estate of Hinds v. State, Mental Health Commissioner, 390 N.E. 2d 172, 173-174 (Ind . Ct. App. 1979).
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(2) Denying Authority
93

On the other hand, in Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, the
California Supreme Court has held that a state statute94 imposing liability upon
a daughter for the care and maintenance of her mother in a state psychiatric
institution violated the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
selected one class of persons for a "species of taxation [with] no rational basis
support[ing] such classification."95
In examining the issues, the court studied the relevant historical background,96 and carefully distinguished cases upholding spousal liability9' ; in such
cases, "the basic obligation and relevant status of the husband arose from the
marriage contract to which he was a consenting party."98 Also, the court considered what it characterized as "the social evolution which has been developing
during the past half century," which has brought "expanded recognition of the
parens patriae principle ... and other social responsibilities . . . and divers
other public welfare programs to which all citizens are contributing through
presumptively duly apportioned taxes." 99
Because the state Supreme Court did not clarify whether its ruling was premised on the equal protection clause of the federal or state constitution, the
100
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the state Supreme Court stated that, while the cognate state and
101
federal provisions "provide generally equivalent but independent protections,"
it made its determination of unconstitutionality "by our construction and appli93

60 Cal. 2d 716, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 388 P. 2d 720 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
Cal. Welfare & Instns. Co. §6650 (1965) ("The husband, wife, father, mother, or children of a mentally ill
person ... shall be liable for his care, support, and maintenance in a state institution of which he is an
inmate ... "
95 Kirchner, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The statutory section in question has been repealed, see Cal. Stats. 1967,
c.1667, p. 4107, §36.5, and has since been replaced by Cal. Welfare & Instns. Co. §7275 (1984), which
contains nearly-identical language. Later developments in Kirchner are discussed infra, at text accompanying
notes 104-108.
Although the party who litigated the Kirchner case was the administratrix of the daughter's estate, see
generally, Part III (C), infra, the case is being discussed in connection with relatives' liability since that is by
far the most significant aspect of the case for further analysis .
96Id. at 489 n.4.
91 Id. at 490, discussing Guardianship of Thrasher, 105 Cal. App. 2d 768,234 P. 2d 230, 235-236 (Ct. App.
1951) .
.9BKirchner, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (emphasis in original). The court also relied on its prior decision in
Department of Mental Health v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 379 P. 2d 22 (Sup. Ct. 1963), see
infra note 144, holding that recovery could not be had as against a father of a criminally-committed patient.
For equal protection purposes, this decision was "dis positive" of the case before it, the Kirchner court found•
Id .
99Id. at 491 .
Kirchner is criticized rigorously in Comment, Compulsory Contribution to Support of State Mental
Patients Held Deprivation of Equal Protection, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 858, 863 (1964); see also, In re Dudley,
239 Cal. App. 2d 401, 48 Cal. Rptr. 790, 794 n.8 (D. Ct. App. 1966) (listing commentary criticizing
Kirschner).
100Department of Mental Hygiene of California v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
101Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 3d 586, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 330, 400 P. 2d 321 (Sup.
Ct. 1965). See generally "Last Frontier," supra note 4.
94
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cation of California law" and not "by compulsion of the Fourteenth Amendment."102
Kirchner was followed 103 in a subsequent case involving the liability of a
parent of an institutionalized mentally ill adult, 104 and was distinguished where
a separate statutory scheme controlled the imposition of parental liability for
the care and maintenance of a mentally incompetent adult daughter in a state
facility for the retarded. 105 Elsewhere, the California courts have declined to
extend its holding to cases involving spousal liability 106 or the obligation of a
parent to a minor child. 101
Finally, much of the precedential persuasiveness of Kirchner was diminished
by a California Supreme Court case upholding a state law requiring adult
children to reimburse the state for certain welfare aid made to their non-institutionalized parents, 108 over the vigorous dissent of two judges (who had joined in
Kirchner) that the decision effectively overruled the Kirchner holding. 109
Also, courts have looked carefully at the claims by relatives that their procedural due process rights have been violated by the means by which such costs of
maintenance were determined. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court struck down
a state law 110 because it failed to (1) provide for notice of hearing on the relatives' request for a new determination of liability, 111 (2) designate a hearing
officer or examiner to make a determination as to liability "either from evidence
or the submitted information," 112 or (3) provide legislative standards or guidelines for the appropriate exercise of rulemaking power. 113

102Id.

103 See

also Hospital Services, Inc. v. Brooks, 229 N.W. 2d 69, 72 (N . Oak. Sup. Ct. 1975), generally
following Kirchner in declaring unconstitutional state statute requiring children to pay for parents' care at
state hospital.
10•Department of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America N. T. & S.A., 3 Cal. App. 3d 949, 83 Cal. Rptr. 559
(Ct. App. 1970).
1osDudley, supra. See also, In re Estate of Preston, 243 Cal. App. 2d 803, 52 Cal. Rptr. 790 (D. Ct. App.
1966), distinguishing Kirchner in case involving guardian of incompetent mentally retarded institutionalized
ward with substantial assets.
106Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor, 246 Cal. App. 2d 24, 54 Cal. Rptr. 432, 434 (D. Ct. App.
1966); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts, 247 Cal. App. 2d 154, 55 Cal. Rptr. 437,441 (Ct. App. 1966)
("It is clear that ... Kirchner refused to equate the basic obligation of the husband arising out of the
marriage contract with an adult daughter's obligation to support a parent").
101see County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 815, 48 Cal. Rptr. 343 (D. Ct. App . 1966) (not denial
of equal protection to impose upon mother liability to county for medical services rendered to minor son in
county hospital), and County of A lameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 534, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (D. Ct. App.
1966) (upholding parent's statutory obligation to support minor child committed to county institution).
1osswoap v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 10 Cal. 3d 490, 111 Cal. Rptr. 136, 516 P. 2d 840 (Sup.
Ct. 1973).
109See id., 111 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). The impact of Swoap on the holding in Kirchner
is considered carefully in Hospital Services, Inc., 229 N.W. 2d at 72- 75.
11 0Miller v. State, Dep't of Treas. (Rev. Div.), 385 Mich. 296, 188 N .W. 2d 795 (Sup. Ct. I971).
'"Cf Powell v. Comm. Dept. of Public Welfare, 455 A. 2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 1983) (appellant
has burden of proving right to abatement or modification of assessment of liability).
112Miller, 188 N.W. 2d at 798. See also, e.g., In re McVey's Estate, 170 Neb. 362, 102 N.W. 2d 632, 634
(Sup. Ct. 1960) (requiring investigation and determination of relative's ability to pay).
113Miller, supra. The court noted that the state statute contained "no legal requirements or provisions to be
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(3) Other Issues
Other cases have considered subsidiary issues arising out of the impact of
divorce proceedings both as to allocation of liability as between potentiallyresponsible relatives and as to spousal liability. 114 In a New York case involving
an institutionalized juvenile, where separate hearings were held in an effort
to
115
assess liability of the juvenile's divorced parents and maternal grandfather, the
court ordered an "integrated proceeding" with notice to all parties, along with
•
an opportunity for "mutual cross-examination." 11 6
Elsewhere, in an ingenious, but ultimately unsuccessful attempt to avoid
liability, a patient's wife argued that, while she had grounds to divorce her
husband prior to his commitment, she declined to initiate such proceedings
because of her religious beliefs, and that, thus, the state relatives' liability
statute amounted to a constitutionally-impermissible preference given to persons whose choice of religion permits divorce . 11 1 The court rejected this ar~ument as "clearly without merit," noting that the statutes "contain nothing which
even remotely purports to impair religious freedom." 11 8
(C) Authority to Bill Estate

As with claims against relatives, 119 most cases have held that statutes imposing
liability on the estates of institutionalized mentally disabled persons are valid
exercises of legislative power, although at least one recent case has limited the
scope of liability so that the survivors' "legitimate needs and comforts" would
still be provided. 120
An early case rejected an estate administrator's argument that the state was
estopped from making demands on the estate because it had originally paid a
share of the patient's costs when hospitalized: when the state "acts of its own
volition, in response to the dictates of humanity, in the performance of a
governmental duty now recognized as resting upon a modern state and for the
121
good of the individual concerned," the elements of estoppel are not present.
applied to the facts by the Department of Revenue in redetermining liability" and operated "with an uncontrolled discretion." Id .
Miller was a sharply-split 4-3 decision. In a lengthy dissent, Judge Brennan argued that the act satisfied
minimal constitutional requirements "since it produces generally fair results and establishes a classification
which bears a reasonable relationship to [its] object . . . "188 N.W. 2d at 798, 81 I.
•••See, e.g., State, Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Wiedemann, I Ohio App. 3d 27, 437
N.E. 2d 1212, 1214-1215 (Ct. App. 1980) (where parents are both obligated to pay for institutional care of
minor child, question of what share each of two divorced parents should pay is matter to be determined from
divorce decree).
115 ln the state statute then operative, the juvenile's father, mother and grandparents were all potentially
responsible for support depending on their "comparative resources and equities." See Department of Welfare
of City of New York v. Mallory, 20 A.D. 2d 884, 248 N.Y.S . 2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 1964), construing N. Y.
Family Ct. Act §415 (1983).
11 6/d .

Department of Mental Health v. Warmbir, 37 Ill. 2d 267, 226 N.E. 2d 4, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
at 5, 6.
11 9 See Part lll(B), supra .
•2°Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, 429 So . 2d 574, 586 (Miss . Sup. Ct. 1983).
121State v. Romme, 93 Conn. 571, 107 A. 519, 520 (Sup . Ct. Err. 1919).

117

11 8/d .
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More recently, a South Carolina court held that the state had a valid claim
against an estate's administrator, finding that care and maintenance in a state
facility is not "unconditional charity but is based upon expectations of future
reimbursement if the circumstances should thereafter permit." 122
In Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, 123 the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the state's power to require reimbursement for
care and treatment was "carefully limited," especially where the patient was
committed involuntarily. 124 Concluded the court:
As long as the State of Mississippi limits such commitments to those,
and only those, truly in need of mental treatment, and as long as the
state confines its mental patients under humane conditions and provides minimally adequate care and treatment, it is not unreasonable
to require the patient, his family or his estate to pay at least a part of
the bill. 125
The court considered carefully the administrator's argument that, because
the patient's initial commitment in 1953 violated his procedural due process
rights, the state's current reimbursement claim cannot withstand due process
scrutiny. 126 After examining the past decade's "explosion of litigation" regarding
the substantive and procedural due process rights of mentally disabled persons,
the court conceded that it was "[w]ithout doubt [that the patient] was denied
both substantive and procedural due process at the time of his [1953] commitment."121
In the context of the proceedings before the court, however, this merely meant
that the state agency was required to "prove [the] fact anew" that the patient
"was in fact mentally ill and in substantial need of institutionalization," proof
that was offered at the hearing below. Procedural due process would be satisfied
if "the estate [were] afforded a reasonably adequate adversary hearing before an
impartial judicial officer at which time [the state agency] had to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence each factual point requisite to the substantive
validity of its reimbursement claim." 128
The court noted, however, that, under state statute, reimbursement claims
could not be asserted "beyond ability to pay," and that the "plight of relatives or
dependents must be considered in determining [such] ability." 129 Under this
122 Minter v. State Dep't of Mental Health, 187 S.E. 2d 890, 893 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1972). See also In re Estate of
Klimko, 111 Misc. 2d 411, 444 N. Y.S. 2d 391 (Surrogate's Ct. 198 I) (state not precluded by its reduction or
waiver of fees from seeking retroactive reimbursement from estate, where claim concededly reflected charges
for care received).
123 429 So. 2d 574 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1983).
124Id. at 576, 579.
125Id. See also id. at 579-580, surveying other jurisdictions where similar powers have been upheld, and id.
at 581-582, collecting cases from other jurisdictions specifically allowing for recovery of similar expenses
from an estate even where the patient was committed prior to the passage of the estate reimbursement act.
126Chil/, 429 So. 2d at 582.
127Id. at 584.
128 Id. at 584. After examining the evidence, the court concluded that the estate's administrator "received full
procedural due process." Id. at 585.
129Id. at 586, citing Miss. Code Ann. §41-7-79 (1972). See also, Wigington v. State Home and Training
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legislative policy, trial courts must allow for the provision of "the legitimate
needs and comforts of the patient and his or her dependents or surviving
relatives" as an "absolute priority" over state claims. 130
Other cases construing similar claims have dealt with various procedural and
substantive aspects of applicable estate law. Thus, where a state initially failed
to seek full reimbursement for a patient's care, that failure did not serve as a
waiver of the state's right to seek full reimbursement from the estate after t_h_e
patient's death. 131 Elsewhere, courts have split on the question of the applicab1hty of statutes of limitations and statutes of nonclaims to claims filed by state
entities against estates 132 and have generally held that a state can reach and
recover from a trust of which an institutionalized person is a beneficiary. 133
Finally, at least one court has considered the question of priority of liens in a
case involving a piece of land owned by an incompetent patient in a state mental
health facility. 134 There, the state supreme court remanded a lower court decision
establishing lien priority because it was clear that the patient had the ability to
pay each of them in full. 135
(D) Authority to Bill "Criminally Confined" Patients for
Their Care and Maintenance

To some extent, special rules have developed in the analysis of cases of
patients whose institutionalization was originally precipitated by some involvement with the criminal justice system: either pursuant to a finding of incompetency to stand trial (1ST), to a determination of "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NORI), or following either arrest or apprehension on criminal charges. 136
Schoof, 486 P. 2d 417, 421 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1971) (reversing judgment because of a "nearly ... complete
vacuum" as to whether estate was "able to pay" during relevant periods).
130
/d. at 586-587. CJ State v. Morris, 303 S.W. 2d 802, 803 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957) (where patient
inherited $ I 0,000 twenty years after his initial commitment, court denied state claim for reimbursement of
prior services and treatment rendered, but indicated that money could be seized only to pay for treatment
rendered after the date of the inheritance).
3
' 'Gass v. State Department of Mental Hygiene, 23 A.D. 2d 329, 255 N.Y.S . 2d 314 (App. Div. 1965). See
also _In re Estate of Gnerre, 87 Misc. 2d 700, 386 N. Y.S. 2d 763 (Surrogate's Ct. 1976) (no waiver where state
previously accepted money at a lesser rate of payment).
32
' Compare State v. Stone, 271 S.W. 2d 741 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1954) (statute of limitations inapplicable),
a nd see also Gnerre, 386 N.Y.S. 2d at 765, to State, Dept. of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v.
Koblentz, 2 Ohio App . 3d 278,441 N.E. 2d 820 (Ct. App. 1981) (statute of limitations applicable), and State
ex ref. Griffin Mem. Hosp. v. Reed, 493 P. 2d 815, 818 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1972) (statute of nonclaims
applicable).
Statutes of nonclaims are discussed in Reith v. County of Mountriaf, 104 N.W. 2d 667, 670-671 (N.Dak.
Sup. Ct. 1960) and in State v. Cracker's Estate, 38 Ala. App. 306, 83 So. 2d 261 (Ct. App. 1955). See
generally Griffin Memorial Hosp., supra.
3
' ~See 41 Am Jur 2d, Incompetent Persons, §58 at 597; on pertinent trust issues generally, see Third
·
National Bank in Nashville v. Brown, 691 S.W. 2d 557 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
At lea st one court has suggested that the decision to invade a trust should be based upon the chances for the
patient's recovery and ultimate release. See Commonwealth v. Sharrett, 218 Va. 684, 240 S.E. 2d 522 (1978).
34
' Clarendon Holding Co. v. Witherspoon, 201 S.E. 2d 924 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1974).
135 /d. at 927.
136

T~e distinction between 1ST and NGRI has been blurred in at least one case, where a defendant was
commttted following a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" until such time as he "is no longer insane."
Hawley, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 719-720. While no finding was ever made with respect to this plea, the court
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(]) ISTs
Courts construing claims made by patients hospitalized pursuant to a finding
of incompetency to stand triaP 37 have generally found that such patients may be
billed for their care and maintenance while so institutionalized, as such a patient is neither "under the direct control of the criminal authorities" 138 nor a
convict, 139 nor is the commitment seen as being punitive in nature. 140 Elsewhere
even though a patient was under the continuing control of a court with criminai
jurisdiction as well, the fact that her commitment followed a finding of mental
illness made it appropriate to subject her to the same sort of financial liability
as a "civil" patient. 141

(2)NGRis
Courts are split, however, on the question of whether such charges can be
assessed against patients committed following a finding of not guilty by reason
of insanity. 142 Although not all of these decisions reflect the most precise and
detailed analysis, the disposition of these cases seem to reflect generally whether the court views the rationale of the commitment as treatment for benefit of
the patient or protection for the benefit of society. 143

(a) Upholding statutes assessing charges
In Matter of Guardianship of Nelson, 144 the guardian of the estate 145 of a
patient who had been committed to a state psychiatric hospital following an
insanity acquittal appealed from a trial court order mandating payment of the
patient's "care and maintenance" while hospitalized, 146 on the grounds that the
construed it as an admission of the underlying charge (of which there appeared to be no factual doubt) which,
"but for M'Naughton type insanity, would affect the crime charged." Id. at 720.
137 See generally Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S . 715 (1972).
138 Commonwealth Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Jenkins, 297 S.E . 2d 692, 695
(Va. Sup. Ct. 1982).
139State v. Kosiorek, 5 Conn. Cir. 542, 259 A. 2d 151, I 52 (App. Div. 1969).
140Id.
141 State ex rel. Mental Health Commissioner v. Guardianship of Wiseman, 393 N.E. 2d 235, 237 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979). See also, In re Estate of Schneider, 50 Ill . 2d 152, 154, 277 N.E. 2d 870 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (trial
competency proceeding "for the protection of [the patient's) constitutional rights to due process and for his
benefit - not for the protection of the public").
142 The constitutionality of commitment procedures following an NG RI finding has been the topic of
significant caselaw development and strenuous debate over the past decade. See, e.g., Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354 (1983); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A. 2d 289 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
143 But see Note, 85 W. VA. L. REV., supra note 52, at 124 (distinctions between involuntarily committed
civil patients and patients committed via the criminal process "unsound if both groups are deprived of their
liberty under state mandated procedures").
144 98 Wis. 2d 261,296 N.W. 2d 736 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
145 See generally Part IIl(C), infra.
146
Under the then-operative statutory scheme, a person "receiving care, maintenance, services and supplies
provided by any institution in this state ... shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services, and
supplies ... "Wis. Stat. Ann. §46.10 (2) (1979). The one exception to this statute exempted persons over the
age of 18 in "prisons." Wis. Stat. Ann. §46.10 (2m) (1979). See Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 737-738.
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statutorily-mandated disparate treatment 147 of insanity acquittees and prisoners
was arbitrary and capricious. 148
The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected his argument that the statutory
scheme violated the equal protection clauses of either the state or federal constitutions, reasoning that (1) such a statute need only satisfy the rational basis test
(since fundamental rights were not implicated), 149 and (2) the "supplies, services
and care" 150 received by prisoners differed from those received by mental patients.151
The statutory exemption for prisoners was "justifiable as a legislative distribution of the economic burdens of institutional care," the c~mrt reasoned,
noting that there was both a "theoretical and factual difference" in the services
received by prisoners and other institutionalized persons:
Theoretically the prisoner is incarcerated as a measure to prevent
harm to the public. Restrained of his liberty, he is not free to commit
criminal acts. This is an historic and a primary reason for the existence of prisons. Factually, the services rendered to the prisoner are
not geared to return him to a state of mental or physical health. They
are geared to sustain him on a day-to-day basis while he serves out his
term ... ,s2
On the other hand, persons receiving care and services in a non-penal institution "share a common trait [: the receipt of] care and services which inure
primarily to their benefit as opposed to the benefit of the public." 153 While the
confinement of some of this group of persons "will be of some value to society
[, t]his benefit ... may reasonably be viewed as secondary to an overriding
purpose of treatment to benefit the individual." 154Such a difference provides "a
reasoned ground for the exemption given the prisoners," 155 and the constitutionality of the statute was thus upheld. '56
In a companion case, the state Supreme Court also found that the statutory
scheme-which vested in the state Department of Health and Human Services
the power to determine from whom payment will be sought and in what
See supra note 146.
8Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 740.
149
/d. at 739, relying on Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S . 656,660 (1973) (statute operates in areas of economics, social welfare).
,sosee supra note 146.
1l'Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 740-741.
152/d. at 740.
141
14

l l l[d.
154

/d. But cf., Jones, 463 U.S. at 364, quoting Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962) ("The fact that
the accused was found to have committed a criminal act [as established in Jones by the verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity] is 'strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil "the preservation of the
peace" '").
155
Nelson, 296 N.W. 2d at 740. This distinction has been relied upon elsewhere. See State ex rel. Dorothea
Dix Hospital v. Davis, 27 N.C. App. 479, 219 S.E. 2d 660 (Ct. App. 1975) (Davis).
156 /d. at 740-741. The court noted that "[v]irtually every reported decision" came to a similar conclusion on
the equal protection question. Id. at 741 n.5, and see cases cited. But see Part IIl(D)(2)(b), infra.
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amount-did not constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. 157 As it
was established state law that such a delegation will be upheld "if the purpose of
~he delegating statute is ascertainable and there are procedural safeguards to
msure that the board or agency acts within that legislative purpose," 158 it was
"clear beyond doubt" that the statute in question - reflecting "clear and well
defined" policies and purposes 159 -should be upheld.
Elsewhere, in another case with a similar fact-setting, 160 a court has rejected
the argument that the assessment of such charges amounted to a tax in violation of state and federal constitutional provisions requiring uniformity and
reasonableness in the mode of tax assessments. 161 As the statutory cost of "care,
treatment and maintenance" 162 was placed on all patients, it did not impose a
non-uniform tax; 163 also, the statutory cost was "not characteristic of a tax at
all," but rather represented "compensation for services rendered ." 164

(b) Upholding challenges to statutes
On the other hand, the state courts of Connecticut have struck down statutes
imposing liability on persons found NORI on the theory that there was no
reasonable ground to differentiate between insanity acquittees and "ordinary
prisoners ." 165 There, where the statutory scheme specifically made no distinction between NORI patients and those civilly committed, 166 the court found
several critical differences between the two categories which proved fatal to the
classification for the purposes of a rational basis inquiry. 167
First, under the state laws which controlled at the critical time periods, 168 the
touchstone of a civil commitment was mental illness and fitness for treatment;
an insanity acquittee, however, could not be released from confinement absent a
finding as to his dangerousness to self or others. 169 While a court could not
Matter of Guardianship of Klisurich, 98 Wis. 2d 274, 296 N.W. 2d 742, 744-746 (Sup. Ct. 1980). See
also, e.g., Davis, 219 S.E. 2d at 663.
1581d. at 745, citing, inter alia, State (Dept. of Admin.) v. ILHR Dept., 77 Wis. 2d 126, 134, 252 N.W. 2d
353 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
1591d. at 745, 746.
1601n Davis, the defendant had been committed to a state hospital following an insanity acquittal. 219 S.E.
2d at 662.
6
' 'ld. at 663.
162N.Car. Gen. Stat. §143-117 (1983) provided that all patients admitted to Dorothea Dix Hospital "are
hereby required to pay the actual cost of their care, treatment, training, and maintenance."
1631d. at 663 .
164 1d. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that paymen t was "a taking of private property
without just compensation" as he actually received the services for which payment was sought. Id. at 664.
165 State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520,473 A. 2d 775, 780 (Sup. Ct. 1984); State v. Miller, 192 Conn. 532,472 A .
2d 1272 (Sup . Ct. 1984). For earlier developments in Connecticut, see McAuliffe, supra.
' 66 Conn. Gen. Stats. §I 7-317 (1975) provided that "the expense for the support and treatment of [a] person
[found NGRI who has been committed for confinement or treatment] shall be computed and paid for in the
same manner as is provided ... for patients committed by courts of probate." See Reed, 473 A. 2d at 776
n.2 .
167
Id. at 778-78 I.
' 68 See Conn. Gen. Stats. §17-178 (1975), since substantially rewritten, see Conn. Gen. Stats. §17-178
(1985). Cf O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); see generally Fasulo v. Ara/eh, 173 Conn. 473, 378
A. 2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
' 69 Reed, 473 A . 2d at 779.
157
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interfere with a hospital decision to release a civilly-committed patient, an
insanity acquittee could only be released with court approval, "Unlike one
whose mental illness has never been manifested by performing a criminal
act, ... the focus of the inquiry with respect to the acquittee is upon the
protection of the community, the same consideration which is of primary concern in relation to the imprisonment of persons convicted of crimes." 110
Although the court conceded that there were some differences between NORI
patients and prisoners as to stigma, as to allocation of jurisdiction as between
executive agencies, and as to release mechanisms, these "have no particular
relevance to the propriety of requiring an insanity acquittee to pay for the same
services which are provided to an ordinary prisoner without charge, because
they are not related to comparative financial ability or need for treatment." 111
Finally, the court distinguished cases from other jurisdictions which had
rejected equal protection challenges 172 since it did not appear "that the statutory
criteria for commitment or release of persons confined by order of the criminal
court differed from those applicable to civil commitments." 173
Elsewhere, a state statute providing that the costs of hospitalization of an
NORI patient were taxable against the state rather than the patient was upheld
in light of a constitutional attack by the Director of the State Department of
Public Health and Welfare, 174 the court rejecting the plaintiffs argument that
the statute violated a state constitutional provision which barred "grants or
gifts" by the authorization of "free hospital treatment to individuals of
means." 115
The fact that the NORI patient was automatically committed 116 to the state
hospital (because of the state's "interest and obligation . . . to protect the public against dangerous individuals") 177 -with the attendant permitted "by-pass of
a person's usual right to a [due process] hearing" 178 - made it "[clear that] this is
not a case where the State is making a simple gift of medical services." 179
(C) Following arrest or apprehension

Finally, New Jersey's state courts have ruled that cost of care and maintenance must be paid in two other circumstances involving the criminal process.
In the first, a trial court ruled that persons transferred from county jails to state
hospitals following arrest and detention on criminal charges were so obligated,
170

/d. at 780 (emphasis added).

1111d.
172

1ncluding, inter alia, Davis, supra. See Reed, 473 A . 2d at 781.

17l/d.
174

Robb v. Estate of Brown, 518 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). The statute before the court in Robb was
subsequently amended so as to make the patient or his estate responsible for costs of hospitalization in cases
following "acquittal because of lack of responsibility due to mental disease or defect," see Rev. Stat. Mo.
§552.080.3(2) (1980), upheld in State ex rel. Foltz v. Ahr, 666 S.W. 2d 777, 779-781 (Ct. App. 1983).
175
Robb, 518 S.W. 2d at 735, paraphrasing Mo. Const'n, §38(a), Art. III.
176
See Jones, 463 U.S . at 361-372.
177
Robb, 518 S.W. 2d at 735.
178
/d. at 736. See generally Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1975), and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980).
119/d.
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r_eas??ing that a contrary ruling might enable individuals to escape financial
~1~b1hty for hospitalization by electing to not post bail (and thus be eligible for
Jail-hospital transfers). 180
In the second, and most unusual case, liability for care and maintenance was
upheld by the state Supreme Court in the case of an individual who after
having previously been civilly committed and institutionalized in a civil hospital, was transferred to a maximum security facility for the "criminally insane"
after _he allegedly assaulted and killed two other patients in the civil hospital,
notwithstanding the fact that no criminal prosecution for homicide was contemplated. 181

IV. Representative Payee Status

Both federal1 82 and state 183 statutes provide for the appointment of representative payees to manage the monetary benefits of beneficiaries determined incapable of managing certain of their own assets. 184 A pre-existing finding of the
beneficiary's legal incompetency is not always essential under the language of
the federal provisions if it "appears . .. that the interest of an applicant entitled to a payment [of social security benefits] would be served thereby." 185
In upholding the constitutionality of the federal scheme, the Tenth Circuit
construed the Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge 186 to hold that
the due process clause does not require prior notice and an opportunity to
contest when an institutionalized Social Security beneficiary is alleged to be
incompetent and incapable of managing his own affairs. 187
After ruling that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required, the
court applied the three-part balancing test of Eldridge, 188 and determined that
180

In re Truslowe, 42 N.J. Super. 23, 125 A. 2d 741, 745 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1956).

181

State v. Le Vien, 44 N .J. 323, 209 A. 2d 97 , 99 (Sup . Ct. 1965) (quoting letter from county prosecutor to
State Attorney General).
182
See 42 U.S.C. §4050) (1985 Supp.); see 20 C.F.R. §404.2001 to .2065 (1985).
183
See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stats. §§210.290 (1982), 387.620 (1984), construed in Commonwealth v. Cabinet for
Human Resources, 686 S.W. 2d 465 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), and Rev. Co. Wash. 72.33.670 (1982), construed in
Duffy v. State, Dep't of Social and Health Services, 90 Wash 2d 673, 585 P. 2d 470 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
184See, e.g., McGrath v. Weinberger, 541 F. 2d 249, 251 (10 Cir. 1976), cert. den. 430 U.S. 933 (1977). See
generally MCCORMICK , SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES (3d ed. 1983), § 15 at 2021; 3 SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE (Matthew Bender 1985), §§22.01 to 22.07 at 22- 1 at 22-13
(Practice Guide); BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE. (1984), §4. 14, at 252-255 .
The "representative payee" scheme is described in detail in Jordan v. Heckler, 744 F. 2d 1397 (10 Cir. 1984),
suppl. proceeding 808 F. 2d 733 (10 Cir. 1987) (mandating periodic accounting by payees).
.
185 42 U.S.C. §405 (j) (1985 Supp.); see generally, 20 c.F.R. §404.2001 (1985), and especially, 20 C.F.R.
§404.200 1 (b) (2) ( 1985) ("We may appoint a representative payee even if the beneficiary is a legally competent
individua l"). See also 20 C.F.R. §404.2065 (1985) (providing account ing procedures to be followed by representa tive payee, a nd establishing mechanism for subm ission of periodic written repo rts).
186
424 U.S. 319 (1976) .
187
McGrath, 541 F. 2d at 253-254.
188
/d. at 252-253.
[F]irst , the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of substitute procedural safeguards; a nd finally, the government's interest, including the
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no such prior hearing was required. First, it distinguished the facts of Eldridge,
which involved the termination of benefits, from the case in question, which
dealt with "a deprivation of free use of benefits." Since there was no due process
violation in Eldridge (which allowed termination without a prior hearing), "it
would be an unwarranted departure on our part" to order such a hearing in a
case involving "no termination of benefits." 189
Second, it characterized the risk of erroneous deprivation of the beneficiary's
interest in the free use of his benefits as "relatively slight" or "minimal," adding
that it would be "unwarranted conjecture" to speculate that t11,e evaluations of
incompetency made by hospital staff and Social Security psychologists reflected
"anything other than a sincere determination" that the appointment of a representative payee would serve the "best interests" of the beneficiary. Third, it
concluded that the governmental interest was "substantial," both as to time and
expense and as to administrative expedience. 190
Substantively, other representative payee cases have considered: (1) the role of
the payee in applying a patient's assets to institutional care, (2) the need for
actual notice prior to a determination of financial responsibility 191 to a patient
with a payee but without a legal guardian, and (3) the appropriateness of the
appointment of the state agency with supervisory powers over the patient as the
payee.
While it is clear that money paid to a representative payee belongs to the
beneficiary, 192 and that the payee is accountable for payments made to him on
account of his beneficiary, 193 there is some authority 194 to suggest that the payee
may be compelled to apply social security benefits to provide for the patient's
care and maintenance while institutionalized. '95

function involved and the fiscal or administrative burden that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
1s9McGrath, 541 F. 2d at 253 .
190Jd. at 253-254:
We agree with the government's contention that requiring a prior hearing would place it in "the
anomalous position of either paying benefits to a person who is incapable of managing these
benefits or, on the other hand, holding up all benefit payments until a capability hearing is
rendered."

(citation omitted).
On the other hand, the Social Security Administration will "generally" notify beneficiaries of its decisions
and will given them some sort of opportunity to object to proposed action. See Bloch, supra note 184, at 253,
and see 20 C.F.R. §404.2030(a) (1985).
191See Part Ill(A), supra.
192State v. Kosiorek, 5 Conn. Cir. 542, 259 A. 2d 151, 154 (App. Div. 1969), citing 42 U.S.C. §405(j).
193Jd. at 154-155, citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1609 (predecessor to 20 C.F.R . §404.2041 (1985)).
19•But see Part V, infra.
i9SKosiorek, 259 A. 2d at 155, citing 20 C.F.R. §404.1606 (predecessor to 20 C.F.R. §404.2035 (1985)): ("It
is considered in the best interests of the beneficiary for the ... person to whom payments are certified on the
beneficiary's behalf to allocate expenditure of the payments so certified in a manner which will facilitate the
beneficiary's earliest possible rehabilitation or release from the institution or which otherwise will help him
Jive as normal a life as practicable in the institutional environment"). But see, Woodall v. Bartolino, Civil No.
85-1781(MTB) (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1985).
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C?n the other hand, provision of notice of a financial responsibility determi?at10n hearing solely to a payee violates due process in cases where "the patient
Is not subject to any legally declared disability." 196 First, such a representative is
not "the equivalent of a legal guardian"; second, even though the patient's
Property is "in the hands of the representative payee, [it] is still [the patient's]
Property" and "no determination regarding that property can be made without
notice to him or a legally appointed guardian ."' 97
Finally, an intermediate state appeals court' 98 has construed state statutes' 99
establishing priorities in the appointment of payees to allow for the designation
0 ~ a state human services department "as a matter of last resort,"200 and thus
remstated a trial court determination so appointing the Cabinet for Human
~es_o~rces as payee where it found that there was "no other available and willing
md1v1dual or entity to assume such [a role]." 201
V. Attachment of Government Benefits to Pay
for "Care and Maintenance"

A significant issue which has not been extensively litigated 202 is the question
of whether a patient's Social Security benefits may be attached by a state or
county government to pay for the care and maintenance of an institutionalized
mentally disabled person, in light of a federal statutory provision which appears
to totally bar such attachments. 203
Under 42 U.S.C. §407(a) (1983) ("§407"):
The right of any person to any future payment ... shall not be
transferrable or assignable, at law or in equity,. and none of the
moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall
be subject to execution, levy, attachment, or other legal process . 204
96

Duffy, 585 P. 2d at 474.
/d. Cf McCormick, supra note 184, at 20-21 (where a beneficiary was found NGRI and subsequently
committed to a state hospital [which was appointed representative payee on his behalf], such an NGRI finding
was not an adjudication of insanity for all purposes, and the Social Security Administration would undertake
to determine whether the beneficiary was capable of managing his own benefits and whether direct payments
should be made directly to him, citing Soc. Sec. Ruling 73-29).
93
' Commonwealth v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 686 S.W. 2d 465 (Ky. Ct. App. l98 4)'99See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. 387.600(1) (1984).
200
Cabinet For Human Resources, 686 S.W. 2d at 468 .
201
•
Id. See also, e.g., Estate of Peter c., 488 A. 2d 468, 470 (Me. Sup. Jud . Ct. 1985) (statute barring
institution housing incapacitated persons from serving as guardian does not automatically bar its employees
from being so named) .
. But see Practice Guide, supra note 184, §22.03[2], at 22-4 (while appointment of the director of a state
institution as representative payee for an institutionalized recipient is not improper per se, such appointment
Often creates an inherent conflict of interest, because of the institution's usual dual role of "creditor [and]
caretaker," citing Tidwell v. Weinberger, [Fed. nansfer Binder Jan. 1976-Jan. 1977] Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) 114,756 (N.D. Ill., June 23, 1976).
202 But see, Woodall v. Bartolino, Civil No. 85-1781 (MTB) (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1985), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 216-231.
203
See 42 U.S.C. §407 (1983).
204
A new section of this statute is explicit:
'

'

97

No other provision of Jaw, enacted before, on or after the date of the enactment of this section,
may be construed to limit, supercede, or otherwise modify the provisions of this section except
to the extent that it does so by express reference to this section.
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In the lead case of Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Board, 205 the Supreme
Court rejected a county's efforts to obtain bank account funds 206 consisting of
Social Security disability benefits so as to partially offset county welfare payments. 201 "We see no reason," ruled the court, "why a state, performing its
statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position as
compared with any other creditor." It construed §407 as imposing "a broad bar
208
against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits."
There has been some dispute in the Circuits as to the application of §407 to
care and maintenance situations. 209 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Philpott in a
case involving a chronic institutionalized and adjudicated incompetent patient
who possessed over $40,000 in social security and veterans' benefits. 210 Because
the state was meeting all of the recipient's needs (and would have to do so for
the remainder of the patient's life), the patient's guardian would never have the
opportunity to use the benefits for her ward's care; thus, allowing attachment
would not circumvent the purpose of the benefits program, which was to provide for the care and maintenance of the recipient. 21 1
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit has upheld §407's broad exclusion in a
case striking down the use of a standard consent form through which a state
hospital asked patients to authorize the facility to reimburse itself for hospitalization costs from the patient's Social Security benefits. 212
In that case, the form failed to clearly inform individual patients that their
reimbursement decision was, in reality, a voluntary one, that the hospital would
provide them with treatment even if they refused to sign, and that their benefits
were not otherwise subject to the legal process .213
This conflict was, in great measure, resolved in 1983 when the Social Security
Act was amended to include §407(b), which stated explicitly that §407(a) could
42 U.S.C. §407 (b) (1983) ("§407(b)").
SSI benefits are also covered by these provisions. 42 U.S.C. §1383 (d) (I) (1985 Supp.). See also, 20 C.F.R .
§404.1820 (1985).
205
409 U.S. 413 (1973).
206
Cf, e.g., Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co. 370 U.S . 159, 162 (1962) (veterans' benefits deposited in savings
and loan association on veteran's behalf retained the "qualities of moneys" and was not a non-exempt
permanent investment, quoting Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354 (1933)). See infra note 210.
207
Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415- 417.
208
Id. at 416,417.
209 See generally Part lll(A), supra.
210
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Davis, 616 F. 2d 828,829 (5 Cir. 1980) (Davis II) . The patient
had been institutionalized in public facilities for nearly thirty years . Id. at 830.
211
Id. at 215-216. Davis II thus distinguished Philpott, where the non-institutionalized welfare recipient
was at least partially responsible for his own care. See 409 U.S. at 415-417 .
212
Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F. 2d 560, 566-568 (7 Cir. 1982).
213 Id. at 563-564.
In other fact settings, federal courts have interpreted §407 strictly to protect bank accounts from garnishment where Social Security funds may have been intermingled with other moneys, see, e.g., Fiberg v.
Sullivan, 634 F. 2d 50 (3 Cir. 1980); see also Reigh v. Schleigh, 595 F. Supp. 1535, 1555 n.15 (D. Md. 1984);
Dionne v. Bouley, 583 F. Supp. 307, 319 (D.R .!. 1984), afj'd 757 F. 2d 1344 (1 Cir. 1985); Deary v. Guardian
Loan C:o., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1178, 1187-1188 (S .D.N .Y. ·1982), and to protect such benefits from recoupment
followmg past overpayments, see McKenzie v. Heckler, 605 F. Supp. 1217, 1219 (D. Minn. 1985); see also
Page v. Heckler, 596 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D . Pa. 1984); McDaniels v. Heckler, 571 F. Supp. 80 (D . Md . 1983);
Ellender v. Schweiker, 575 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N .Y. 1983).
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be modified only by express reference. 214 The legislative history to this amended
section is unambiguous:
Since 1935 the Social Security Act has prohibited the transfer or
assignment of any future social security or SSI benefits payable and
further states that no money payable or rights existing under the Act
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment or other
legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency
law.
Based on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, some bankruptcy courts have considered social security and
SSI benefits listed by the debtor to be income for purposes of a
Chapter XIII bankruptcy and have ordered [the Social Security Administration] in several hundred cases to send all or part of a debtor's
benefit check to the trustee in bankruptcy.
Your Committee's bill specifically provides that social security and
SSI benefits may not be assigned notwithstanding any other provisions of law, including P.L. 95-598, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.215
This backdrop has been recently carefully examined in Woodall v. Bartolino, 216 where plaintiffs sought, inter alia, 211 a declaration that the benefits in
Question were exempt from attachment by county officials to pay for their care
and maintenance at a state psychiatric hospital. 21 8 In finding that the benefits
Were so exempt, 219 the district court specifically found that, if Davis II (the Fifth
Circuit case which had allowed for attachment) 220 "has continuing life, ... it
[must be] limited to the extreme factual situation presented ... in that case."22 1
214

See supra note 204.
H.R. Rep, No. 98-25, 98th Cong., Jst Sess. 82-83 (1983); see also House Conj Rep., No . 98-47, 98th
Cong., !st Sess. 153 (1983).
This amendment has been construed to explicitly supercede cases where bankruptcy courts had ordered the
use of Social Security benefits to pay creditors, see Matter of Treadwell, 699 F. 2d 1050, 1053 (11 Cir. 1983);
United States v. Decal/, 704 F. 2d 1513, 1516 (11 Cir. 1983).
216
Civil No. 85- 1781 (MTB) (D.N.J., Oct. 24, 1985).
217
See id. at 22-24.
218 Woodall, slip op. at 2. The Woodall class consisted of " I) all Mercer County residents receiving Social
Security benefits who have been or in the future will be hospitalized in a New Jersey state psychiatric
institution and who have been or in the future will be ordered to pay for their hospitalizations from their
Social Security benefits, and 2) all persons who now act or in the future will act as representative payees for
such Mercer County residents." Id.
219
/d. at 12-22 .
iwsee supra text accompanying notes 215.
22 1
Woodall, slip op. at J7:
215

The individual in Davis [fl] had been in state institutions for almost thirty years, had long been
judged incompetent, had little hope of ever emerging from the institution in which he resided,
and his guardian had accumulated a large amount of funds which, because of this individual's
situation, would almost certainly ~ever be used for his care and maintenance, unless they were
turned over to the state which was providing for his care and maintenance and had been for
years. Here, of course, plaintiff Alfreda K. has been intermittently institutionalized and otherwise resides with plaintiff Woodall.
Id.
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Although the court found it appropriate that a portion of plaintiffs' soci~l
security benefits be utilized to pay for patients' care and maintenance costs, it
specified that it was the responsibility of the federal government (not the state)
to enforce a representative payee's duties, and that this enforcement was limited
222
to liability for the misuse of funds and the appointment of a new payee. ?n
the other hand, institutional care payments "for the beneficiary's current mamtenance"223 are appropriate224 and may include-in cases where the recipient is
institutionalized for "mental or physical incapacity"225- "the customary charges
in the institution."226
Thus, the court concluded that, while defendants may not use the power of
state courts to enforce the application of Social Security benefits for the care
and maintenance of an institutionalized individual, it would nonetheless be
"appropriate" for these benefits to be applied to a patient's care and maintenance. 221
228
Procedurally, the court found it appropriate for defendant Bartolino .to
convene a "non-adversarial" hearing in conformity with state statute, to inquire into the willingness and ability ~f a representative payee ·to pay a sum out
of social security benefits towards the cost of a patient's care and maintenance:229
While the representative payee has discretion in this regard, and while
it may be quite clear that, for a variety of reasons, nothing or something can or should be contributed, the exercise of that discretion can
be reviewed and enforced by the District Office [of the Social Security
Administration] and not by defendant Bartolino or by the state
courts.•j0
The court thus entered a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from
enforcing judicial orders for care and maintenance against the plaintiffs' Social
Security benefits. 231
222 /d. at 18, citing 20 C.F.R. §404.2041 (1985); 404.2050 (1985).
223 20 C.F.R. §404.2040(a) (1985).
224 Woodall,
225 20

slip op. at 18.

C.F.R. §404.2040(b) (1985).

226/d.
227

Woodall, slip op . at 21:
Thus, while such payments must be voluntary, it is nonetheless clear that a representative payee
has a responsibility, if it is possible to do so, to make such payments, a responsibility and
exercise of discretion the violation of which can be enforced by removing the representative
payee and, perhaps, naming as payee the institution caring for the payment. See 220 C.F.R.
§§404.2041, 404.2050, 416.601(a)(2}.

Id. Cf Cabinet for Human Resources, supra .
228 Named defendant Bartlolino was the county adjuster, the official responsible for investigating the
financial ability of patients and their relatives to pay for the costs of institutionalization, and for serving as
the "referee" for the purpose of taking testimony on that question. Woodall, slip op . at 8; see N.JS.A . 30:434 (1981); see generally, N.JS.A . 44:1-1 (1940), and N.JS.A. 44:7-1 (1980 Supp.}.
229 Woodall, slip op . at 21.
230 /d. at 21 - 22.
23 1/d. at 22- 23.
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VI. Conclusion

The above discussion reveals, at best, a "mixed bag" of caselaw. While several
?Pinions reflect serious decision-making on the part of the courts, 232 most
1~volve simply workman-like constructions of older statutory schemes, with
httle consideration paid to the parallel constitutional and statutory develop~ents in other areas of patients' rights law. 233 Rarely are the collateral economic
issues- those related to ex-patient self-sufficiency in the community and the
relationship between lack of deinstitutionalization planning to post-hospitalization homelessness- considered, and, only in a few cases- notably Vecchione,
Chill, and the unreported Woodall decision-is there a sense that the courts
were looking at the economic issues as part of the larger fabric of the constitutional and civil rights of the institutionalized. 234
It is somewhat difficult to attempt to discern doctrinal threads or trends in
this group of cases. That difficulty is probably a reflection of the reality that the
cases were decided episodically and idiosyncratically, and not with any strong
sense (on the part of the courts) that the entire body of patients' rights law is
one which is in significant flux. 235 To some extent, this is probably a reflection of
the fact that few of the cases appear to be the result of conscious, affirmative
law reform litigation.236 This may help account for the fact that- even in those
ar~as in which constitutional principles have been shaped- there has been surPnsingly little "follow-up" litigation in other jurisdictions following the initial
decision. 237
It is also unclear as to what paths further litigation in this area will take. Any
Prediction here is dependent on several paradoxical variables: a legislative countertrend which is resulting in the re-loosening of civil commitment criteria in
many states (as a reflection that the "pendulum" has "swung too far" toward the

232£.g., Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, supra, discussed in Part II(A), supra; Chill v. Mississippi Reimbursement Commission, supra, discussed in Part JII(C), supra; Woodall v. Bartolino, supra, discussed in Part V,
supra.
233
See, e.g. , sources cited supra note 4.
23
'E.g. , in Vecchione, the court looked carefully at the implications of the presumption of incompetency; in
Chill, the court took note of the substantive and procedural due process decisions which have significantly
altered the relationship between patients and hospitals; in Woodall, the court showed sensitivity to the special
Problems of the "intermittently institutionalized" patient.
235 See generally Last Frontier, supra note 4. For an example, see the sharp contrast in the way the Courts of
Appeals have considered whether or not there is a right to community treatment following the Supreme
Court's decisions in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S . 307 (1982), and Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). Compare, e.g., Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F. 2d 367 (4 Cir. 1986), cert.
den . 106 S. Ct. 1992 (1986), and Clark v. Cohen, 794 F. 2d 79 (3 Cir. 1986), cert. den. 55 U.S.L.W. 3358 (1986)
(applying the right), to Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F. 2d 1239 (2 Cir. 1984)
and Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F. 2d 365 (7 Cir. 1983) (refusing to apply the right).
236 Vecchione is a clear exception . For a comprehensive analysis of a prototypical law reform case involving
the right of institutionalized patients' to treatment, see, e.g., Jones & Parlour, eds., WYATT V. STICKNEY:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT (1981). But see, Stevens," Wyatt v. Stickney Concludes With A Whimper,"
11 MENT. & PHYS . DIS. L. RPTR. 139 (1987). On the question of law reform and public law litigation in
general, see, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge on Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976);
Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALABAMA L. REV. 271 (1981).
237
See, e.g., supra notes 25, 44.
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"civil liberties-model" in cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt), 238 at the same time
that federal legislation is making available (for the first time) funds to each state
to develop "Protection and Advocacy Systems" to provide representation to the
institutionalized mentally disabled '·239 the increased hostility on the part. of
many federal courts toward the idea of mental disability law reform240 at a time
when litigants are beginning to approach state courts as a preferred forum for
civil rights litigation on behalf of the population in question; 241 the realization
that, no matter what treatment and social advances are made in coping with the
problems raised by deinstitutionalization, 242 economic issues must be given
243
equal consideration in any attempts to grapple with problems of the homeles~While these issues are still being sorted out, it is clear that the underlying
economic issues will not disappear. Although this has not been a major priority
for attorneys litigating on behalf of the mentally disabled, for legislators, for
policy-makers, or for mental disability professionals, the issues are important
and timeless ones. If the mega-issues of treatment and deinstitutionalization are
to be effectively resolved, it is necessary that the meta-issue of economic rights
be, once and for all, taken seriously.

238
The use of the "pendulum" metaphor has grown exponentially in recent years . See, e.g., Durham &
LaFond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil
Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL. REV. 395, 398 (1985) ("the pendulum of public attitudes and state policy is
swinging again"); Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System in Need of Change, 29
VILL. L. REV. 367, 379 (1983-84) ("the pendulum may have swung too far"); Shuman, Innovative Statutory
Approaches to Civil Commitment: An Overview and Critique," 13 L., MED . & HEALTH CARE 284, 286
(1985) ("Now, it appears the swing toward dangerousness as an all exclusive criterion for commitment of the
mentally ill has reached the height of its arc and has begun to reverse directions").
239
See the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. §10801 el seq. (1986 Supp.)
(Pamph. Ill).
240
See generally "Last Frontier," supra note 4. See, e.g., Le/sz v. Kavanagh, 807 F. 2d 1243 (5 Cir. 1987),
rev'g 629 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (vacating institutional rights consent decree under authority of
Pennhurst, supra).
2 1
• The prototype recent case is Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485,504 N.Y.S. 2d 74,495 N.E. 2d 337 (Ct. App.
~~86) (right to refuse treatment under state constitution), discussed extensively in "Last Frontier," supra note

22
• See, e.g., Lehmann, Possidente & Hawken, The Quality of Life of Chronic Patients in a Stale hospital
and m Community Residences, 37 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCH . 901 (1986).
243
See, e.g., Kanter, Hom eless Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight or Out of Mind, 3 N. Y.L.S.
HUM. RTS. ANN. 331 (1986).

